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We are told that no distinction is to be made between the state of a natural object 
and what I know about it, or perhaps better, what I can know about it if I go to 
some trouble. Actually – so they say – there is intrinsically only awareness, 
observation, measurement. If through them I have procured at a given moment 
the best knowledge of the state of the physical object that is possibly attainable 
in accord with natural laws, then I can turn aside as meaningless any further 
questioning about the “actual state”, inasmuch I am convinced that no further 
observation can extend my knowledge of it. (Schrödinger 1935, p. 157) 
 
From those who made [the Copernican] revolution we learned that the world is 
more intelligible when we do not imagine ourselves to be at the centre of it. Does 
not quantum theory place observers…us…at the centre of the picture? There is 
indeed much talk of ‘observables’ in quantum theory books. And from some 
popular presentations the general public could get the impression that the very 
existence of the cosmos depends on our being here to observe the observables. I 
do not know that this is wrong. I am inclined to hope that we are indeed 
important. But I see no evidence that it is so in the success of contemporary 
quantum theory. (Bell (2004), p. 170)  
 
 
Abstract 
According to a widespread view, the Bell theorem establishes the untenability of  so-called 'local realism'. 
On the basis of this view, recent proposals by Leggett, Zeilinger and others have been developed according 
to which it can be proved that even some non-local realistic theories have to be ruled out. As a consequence, 
within this view the Bell theorem allows one to establish that no reasonable form of realism, be it local or 
non-local, can be made compatible with the (experimentally tested) predictions of quantum mechanics. In the 
present paper it is argued that the Bell theorem has demonstrably nothing to do with the 'realism' as defined 
by these authors and that, as a consequence, their conclusions about the foundational significance of the Bell 
theorem are unjustified. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The question of how we should reshape the notion of physical reality after the advent of quantum 
mechanics continues to hold  a central position in foundational debates, whereas the startling 
advances in experimental physics, and especially in quantum optics, seem to open up new ways of 
addressing the foundational issues in quantum mechanics. In particular, the scope of the Bell 
theorem and the exact nature of the constraints it prescribes for any consistent theory of quantum 
phenomena still remain crucial in most discussions even in very recent times. 
 In the April, 19 2007 issue of Nature an article was published (Gröblacher et al (2007)) in which 
a new experimental procedure was proposed for testing an inequality derived within a new class of 
theories, called non-local realistic theories (a class of theories originally introduced in Leggett 
(2003)). The authors could show that this inequality, which is derivable from the conditions of the 
above-mentioned non-local realistic theories, is at variance with the predictions of quantum 
mechanics: since – according to the authors – the Bell theorem shows that local realistic theories are 
incompatible with quantum mechanics, the conclusion of Gröblacher et al was that realism cannot 
be maintained even in a wide class of theories in which the locality requirement is relaxed.   
 As will be shown more in detail later, the whole enterprise depends crucially on the claim that 
the Bell theorem has within its premises both locality and a condition called ‘realism’, a condition 
which is often formulated, even recently, as the idea that physical systems are endowed with certain 
pre-existing properties, namely properties possessed by the systems prior and independently of any 
measurement interaction and that determine or may contribute to determine the measurement 
outcomes (Gröblacher S. et al (2007), p. 871). Although it has been clearly shown –  from the 
original 1964 Bell paper right up to more recent instances (Maudlin (1996), Norsen (2007)) – that 
the Bell theorem does not include any ‘realism’ among its assumptions and that the non-locality 
established by the theorem holds for any theory that preserves quantum-mechanical predictions, be 
it ‘realistic’ or ‘non-realistic’, there seems to be a die-hard tendency to regard the Bell theorem as a 
result that does not establish non-locality but rather the impossibility of any objective (i.e. observer-
independent in principle) account of the physical world, provided quantum mechanics is taken for 
granted. As a matter of fact, not only is the correct interpretation of the Bell theorem  not fully 
acknowledged but also complex experimental settings are designed in important laboratories around 
the world, in order to test what appear as the implications of a clearly incorrect interpretation of the 
Bell theorem. Moreover, such ill-founded interpretations of one of the most relevant results for the 
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whole field of the foundations of physics are disseminated – as the Gröblacher S. et al (2007) paper 
shows – in the most respected scientific journals. 
All this suggests that a re-assessment of the question is still needed: the present paper is meant to 
show how the above-mentioned incorrect interpretation of the Bell theorem leads to carrying out the 
pursuit of implausible research programs on the foundations of quantum mechanics.  
 The plan of the paper is the following. In section 2 I will summarize the main claims contained 
in Gröblacher et al (2007) and concerning (i) the role of the so-called local realism in several 
versions of the Bell theorem (in fact the claim on this point represents views expressed implicitly or 
explicitly in many other more or less recent places disseminated in the literature, especially in the 
field of the quantum theory of information and computation); (ii) the prospects of investigating a 
new class of theories – called non-local realistic theories – as a consequence of the interpretation 
attached to the meaning of the Bell theorem according to (i). Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to a 
critical analysis of such claims: since the logically fundamental claim of these authors is that the 
Bell theorem is a consequence of assuming locality and realism, the aim of these sections is to show 
in what sense no independent ‘realistic’ assumption plays any role in establishing the conclusion of 
the Bell theorem, either in the strict (Bell (1964)) or in the non-strict correlation framework (Bell 
(1971), (1981))1. In doing this, two collateral but important points will be stressed. Firstly, not only 
was no ‘realistic’ assumption  de facto required in the proof of the Bell theorem (either in 
deterministic or in stochastic settings), but also that a possible interpretation of ‘realism’ in terms of 
a pre-existing property assumption is inconsistent with quantum mechanics (Bell (1966), no matter 
whether locality or non-locality are taken into account or not (Laudisa (1997)). Second, it will be 
stressed that Bell himself was perfectly clear about the irrelevance of any ‘realistic’ assumption for 
the derivation of his theorem (again, both in the deterministic and stochastic setting).  
Finally in section 5, on the basis of the conclusions drawn in the preceding sections, I will argue 
against the relevance of assessing the compatibility with quantum mechanics of theories that are 
assumed to be non-local and yet realistic in the above mentioned ill-founded sense. I will also argue 
that endorsing such a sort of ‘realism’ leads first to the investigation of  theories that are totally 
irrelevant  from the viewpoint of the foundations of quantum mechanics, and secondly to overlook 
theories that are much more significant but which for very serious and structural reasons do not fall 
under the category of non-local realistic theories.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 I speak here of ‘realism’ in quotation marks precisely because the controversial matter is just what it takes to be 
‘realistic’ toward the quantum mechanical description of physical systems. 
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2 On the role of local realism in the Bell theorem 
 
The best place to start is with  the summary of the situation as depicted by Gröblacher et al (2007): 
  
Bell’s theorem proves that all hidden-variable theories based on the joint assumption of locality and 
realism are at variance with the predictions of quantum physics. Locality prohibits any influences 
between events in space-like separated regions, while realism claims that all measurement outcomes 
depend on pre-existing properties of objects that are independent of the measurement. The more 
refined versions of Bell’s theorem By Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt and by Clauser and Horne 
start from the assumptions of local realism and result in inequalities for a set of statistical correlations 
(expectation values), which must be satisfied by all local-realistic hidden variable theories. The 
inequalities are violated by quantum mechanical predictions. [...] So far all experiments motivated by 
these theorems are in full agreement with quantum predictions [...] Therefore it is reasonable to 
consider the violation of local realism a well established fact. (p. 871, italics added) 
 
In the authors’ text, the expression ‘Bell’s theorem’ without qualification refers to the original 1964 
formulation by John S. Bell, in which the ideal experimental setting contemplated the emission of 
pairs of spin-1/2 particles prepared at the source in the spin singlet state. In this ideal setting the 
source state of the joint system prescribes a strict anticorrelation between the measurement 
outcomes in the two wings of the experimental setting, whereas the measurement outcomes were 
supposed to be associated with spacetime regions that are space-like separated (Bell (1964)). On the 
other hand, in the ‘more refined versions’ of Bell’s theorem which the text refers to, the strict 
anticorrelation requirement is relaxed and this in turn paves the way toward an experimentally 
feasible test of the Bell inequality  (Clauser, Horne, Shimony, Holt (1969), Bell (1971), Clauser, 
Horne (1974), Bell (1981)). In the Gröblacher et al (2007) approach, holding realism amounts to 
assuming the following: 
 
REALISMG&AL – The physical systems under scrutiny are endowed with pre-existing properties 
that (i) do not depend essentially on the measurement interactions the systems themselves may 
undergo, (ii) determine all the outcomes of possible measurements that can be performed on the 
physical systems.  
 
The two points (i) and (ii) are reminiscent of the widespread terms ‘Non-Contextuality’ and 
‘Determinism’, respectively. The point (i), in particular, seems to presuppose that, in order for a 
theory to be ‘Realist G&AL’, the pre-existing properties do not depend on the measurement 
 5 
interactions in that they are passively revealed by the measurements themselves.2 Clearly, the 
subscript ‘G&AL’ is meant to refer to the Gröblacher et al (2007) formulation of ‘realism’. 
 As mentioned above, the idea that REALISMG&AL is an independent condition under which – 
jointly with a locality condition – the Bell theorem can be proved is still a widespread idea, that can 
be found formulated in essentially the same terms in several (more or less recent) texts, although in 
most of these texts it is far from clear whether the authors really assume REALISMG&AL, namely 
both conditions (i) and (ii) of the above definition or just one of them. In his Lectures on quantum 
theory Chris J. Isham, for instance, claims that in the usual spin correlation framework of the Bell 
theorem “the central realist assumption we are testing is that each particle has a definite value at all 
times for any direction of spin” (Isham (1995), p. 215), and after the inequality has been derived we 
read (p. 216) 
 
It is important to emphasize that the only assumptions that have gone into proving [the inequality] are: 
1. For each particle it is meaningful to talk about the actual values of the projection of the spin along 
any direction. 
2. There is locality in the sense that the value of any physical quantity is not changed by altering the 
position of a remote piece of measuring equipment. 
 
In their book on the foundations of quantum computations and information, after summarizing the 
lesson that is supposed to be drawn from the Bell theorem, Michael A. Nielsen and Isaac L. Chuang 
claim: 
 
What can we learn from Bell’s inequality? For physicists, the most important lesson is that their 
deeply held commonsense intuitions about how the world works are wrong. The world is not locally 
realistic. Most physicists take the point of view that it is the assumption of realism which needs to be 
dropped from our worldview in quantum mechanics, although others have argued that the assumption 
of locality should be dropped instead. Regardless, Bell’s inequality together with substantial 
experimental evidence now points to the conclusion that either or both of locality and realism must be 
dropped from our view of the world if we are to develop a good intuitive understanding of quantum 
mechanics. (Nielsen, Chuang (2000), p. 117) 
 
Along similar lines, Asher Peres and Daniel Terno have argued that  
 
                                                 
2
 To be fair, Gröblacher et al (2007) are not entirely clear on this presupposition but I claim that my interpretation of 
their condition is the most reasonable if one wishes to preserve consistency with what they claim in their paper as their 
general conclusion. 
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Bell’s theorem (1964) asserts that it is impossible to mimic quantum theory by introducing a set of 
objective local “hidden” variables. It follows that any classical imitation of QM is necessary nonlocal. 
However Bell’s theorem does not imply the existence of any nonlocality in quantum theory itself.” 
(Peres, Terno (2004), p. 104) 
 
Cristopher Fuchs and Asher Peres have emphasized the same point by claiming that “John Bell 
formally showed that any objective theory giving experimental predictions identical to those of 
quantum theory would necessarily be nonlocal.” (Fuchs, Peres (2002), p. 71)3, whereas in a recent 
article devoted to the EPR argument in the so-called ‘relational approach’ to quantum mechanics, 
Smerlak and Rovelli formulate the issue in the following terms: 
 
In the original 1935 article, the EPR argument was conceived as an attack against the description of 
measurements in Copenhagen quantum theory and a criticism of the idea that Copenhagen quantum 
mechanics could be a complete description of reality. Locality and a strong form of realism were given 
for granted by EPR and completeness was argued to be incompatible with quantum-mechanical 
predictions. With Bell’s contribution, which showed that EPR correlations are incompatible with the 
existence of a hypothetical complete local realist theory, the argument has been mostly reinterpreted as 
a direct challenge to “local realism”. [...] On the other hand, the Kochen-Specker theorem has 
questioned the very possibility of uncritically ascribing “properties” to a quantum system. From this 
perspective, the problem of locality moves to the background, replaced by a mounting critique of 
strongly objective notions of reality. Here we take this conceptual evolution to what appears to us to 
be its necessary arriving point: the possibility of reading EPR-type experiments as a challenge to 
Einstein’s strong realism, rather than locality. (Smerlak, Rovelli 2007, p. 427, last italics added)4 
 
On the basis of the above argument, then, a Bell-type inequality can be (i) derived from locality and 
REALISMG&AL, and (ii) shown to be contradicted by the statistical predictions of quantum 
mechanics. After a large number of experimental tests that confirm the latter5, hence showing that 
the Bell inequality cannot be valid in the quantum domain, “it is reasonable to consider the violation 
of local realism a well established fact.” (Gröblacher et al (2007), p. 871, italics added) 
                                                 
3
 See also Zukowski (2005), pp. 569-570. By ‘objective’ the authors in both the last quotations mean ‘realistic’ in the 
sense of our REALISMG&AL formulation. For examples of authors who correctly do not assume REALISMG&AL as an 
independent condition in referring to the Bell theorem, see for instance Squires (1986), pp. 83-91, and D’Espagnat 
(1995), pp. 142-3.  
4
 Norsen (2007), pp. 312-314, interestingly traces a sort of true history of the claim according to which “local realism” 
is held to be the focus of the Bell theorem. 
5
 References to the reports of such experiments can be found in Gröblacher et al (2007). 
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 Since logically we would have an alternative between locality and REALISMG&AL, so that at least 
one of the two must be dropped, in the following, Gröblacher et al (2007) depict the prospects of 
any investigation taking seriously the above alternative: 
 
The logical conclusion one can draw from the violation of local realism is that at least one of its 
assumptions fails. Specifically, either locality or realism or both cannot provide a foundational basis 
for quantum theory. Each of the resulting possible positions has strong supporters and opponents in the 
scientific community. However, Bell’s theorem is unbiased with respect to those views: on the basis of 
this theorem, one cannot, even in principle, favour one over the other. It is therefore important whether 
incompatibility theorems similar to Bell’s can be found in which at least one of the these concepts is 
relaxed. Our work addresses a broad class of non-local hidden-variable theories that are based on a 
very plausible type of realism and that provide an explanation for all existing Bell-type experiments. 
Nevertheless we demonstrate, both in theory and experiment, their conflict with quantum predictions 
and observed measurement data. (Gröblacher et al (2007), pp. 871-2) 
 
The new step then would be  to investigate the viability of a class of theories that accept a 
weakening of  the locality requirement while sticking to a ‘very plausible type of realism’. The 
upshot of this line of research consists finally in proving, via new testable inequalities, that no 
matter how non-local our theory might be, we cannot adhere to any reasonable form of realism 
whatsoever if we agree to preserve the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. 
 The specific features of this new class of non-local realistic theories were proposed for the first 
time in Leggett (2003). As a general premise, and in line with the above-mentioned quotations, 
Leggett claims that 
 
Bell’s celebrated theorem states that, in a situation like that considered by Einstein et al., which 
involves the correlation of measurements on two spatially separated systems which have interacted in 
the past, no local hidden-variable theory (or more generally, no objective local theory) can predict 
experimental results identical to those given by standard quantum mechanics. (p. 1469, italics added) 
 
Leggett proposes then introducing a class of non-local hidden-variable theories – namely a class of 
theories which, while retaining ‘objectivity’ (as will be seen later, it is the above-formulated 
REALISMG&AL condition), accept the incorporation of  the possibility of non-local physical 
processes. The motivation for such a theoretical move is the following: 
 
In my view, the point of considering such theories is not so much that they are in themselves a 
particularly plausible picture of physical reality, but that by investigating their consequences one may 
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attain a deeper insight into the nature of quantum-mechanical “weirdness” which Bell’s theorem 
explores. In particular I believe that the results of the present investigations provide quantitative 
backing  for a point of view which I believe is by now certainly well accepted at the qualitative level, 
namely that the incompatibility of the predictions of objective local theories with those of quantum 
mechanics has relatively little to do with locality and much to do with objectivity. (p. 1470, italics 
added) 
 
The theories in the Leggett class are supposed to account for the results obtained in a general 
experimental framework, in which some polarization measurements are performed on pairs of 
photons emitted by atoms in a cascade process (Leggett (2003), p. 1471 ff). Since this framework 
encompasses, after the emission, a number of detection processes involving a pair of spatially 
separated detectors (let us call them D1 and D2), attention is focused as usual on correlations 
between the counts: clearly, the aim is to compare the predictions for a given function of such 
correlations as prescribed by quantum mechanics on the one hand and by (what Leggett assumes as) 
a general hidden-variable theory on the other. 
 The general conditions that the Leggett-type of theories are assumed to satisfy are the following 
(Leggett (2003), pp. 1473-4): 
L1. Each pair of photons emitted in the cascade of a given single atom is characterized by a 
unique value of some set of hidden variables denoted by λ. 
L2. In a given type of cascade process, the ensemble of pairs of emitted photon is determined by 
statistical distribution of the values of λ, characterized by a normalized distribution function ρ(λ). 
Such function is assumed to be independent of any parameter concerning polarizer settings (denoted 
in the sequel with a and b) and detection processes. 
L3. If A and B denote respectively two variables that take the value + 1 (− 1) according to 
whether  the detectors D1 and D2  register (do not register) the arrival of a photon, the value of A 
may depend not only on a and λ but also possibly on b, and similarly the value of B may depend 
not only on b and λ but also possibly on a. 
 
Condition L1 expresses the requirement (i) of REALISMG&AL, condition L2 prevents the possibility 
of  conspiratorial dependences between the source and any parameter involved in the spacetime 
regions where the polarizers and the detectors are located, whereas L3 allows for possibly non-local 
influences of polarizer setting parameters on the outcomes6. Clearly this last condition, which  
according to the Leggett terminology characterizes the theories of the class as crypto-nonlocal, is 
                                                 
6
 It might be called ‘Non-local determinism’, since the actual outcomes are well determined by the pre-existing 
properties of the systems but possibly also in a non-local way. 
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where the theory is supposed to go beyond the class of theories ruled out by the Bell theorem 
(according to the Leggett and followers’ approach)7. Jointly, L1-L3 imply the following expression 
for the correlation to be measured P(a, b) 
P(a, b) = ∫Λ A(a, b, λ) B(b, a, λ) ρ(λ) dλ 
In addition to L1-L3, it is assumed that the local averages 〈A〉 and 〈B〉 agree with the relevant 
quantum mechanical predictions, which appears to be a rather natural ‘consistency’ condition on the 
Leggett class of hidden-variable theories (Leggett (2003), pp. 1476-9, Gröblacher et al (2007), p. 
872). The last step is then the statement of an ‘incompatibility’ result consisting in the derivation, 
within crypto-nonlocal realistic hidden-variable theories, of an inequality that is violated by the 
corresponding quantum mechanical expressions (Leggett (2003), sect. 3).  
 Gröblacher et al (2007) elaborate a refinement of the Leggett framework by introducing a class 
of theories based on the following assumptions: 
 
(1) All measurement outcomes are determined by pre-existing properties of particles independent of 
the measurement (realism); (2) physical states are statistical mixtures of subensembles with definite 
polarizations, where (3) polarization is defined such that the expectation values taken for each 
subensemble obey Malus’ law. (Gröblacher et al (2007), p. 872) 
 
Since the theoretical framework is intended to be as general as to possibly allow some form of non-
locality, Gröblacher et al (2007) assume that any individual measurement outcome for a 
polarization measurement along a fixed direction u is ‘predetermined’ not only by hidden variable λ 
(in addition to u) but also by some unspecified non-local parameter η, such that, if A denotes the 
measurement outcome, we have A = A(λ, u, η). Moreover, they introduce a probability distribution 
ρu(λ), by taking into account the possibility that particles with the same u might have different 
λ giving rise to subensembles of definite polarization. The final move is in two steps. First, on the 
basis of the above assumptions a further Leggett-type inequality is derived (Gröblacher et al (2007), 
p. 873). Second, a refined experimental setting is introduced that employs spontaneous parametric 
down conversion techniques, with the aid of which the Leggett-type inequality can be effectively 
tested against quantum mechanical predictions (Gröblacher et al (2007), pp. 874-5). The lesson to 
be learned,  according to the last authors,  is  summarized in the conclusion of  the article: 
                                                 
7
 As a matter of fact, the Leggett-type of theories are ‘realistic’ hidden variable theories that are assumed to be non-local 
by accepting outcome independence but dropping parameter independence (according to the Shimony revision of the 
terminology introduced in Jarrett (1984). I postpone to section 5 the discussion on how happily a REALISM assumption 
may coexist with parameter dependence. I wish also to stress that in presenting the Leggett framework I skip several 
technical details that, although deserving attention, are inessential to the present discussion. 
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We have experimentally excluded a class of important non-local hidden-variable theories. In an 
attempt to model quantum correlations of entangled states, the theories under considerations assume 
realism, a source emitting classical mixtures of polarized particles (for which Malus’ law is valid) and 
arbitrary non-local dependencies via the measurement devices. Besides their natural assumptions, the 
main appealing feature of these theories is that they allow us both to model perfect correlations of 
entangled states and to explain all existing Bell-type experiments. We believe that the experimental 
exclusion of this particular class indicates that any non-local extension of local theory has to be highly 
counterintuitive. [...] Furthermore, one could consider the breakdown of other assumptions that are 
implicit in our reasoning leading to the inequality. They include Aristotelian logic, counterfactual 
definiteness, absence of actions into the past or a world that is not completely deterministic. We 
believe that our results lend strong support to the view that any future extension of quantum theory 
that is in agreement with experiments must abandon certain features of realistic descriptions. (p. 875, 
italics added) 
 
The aim of the subsequent sections is to show that these conclusions follow on from a totally 
misguided interpretation of the Bell theorem and that, as a consequence, cannot have the 
significance Leggett (2003) and Gröblacher et al (2007) (and all their followers) attach to them 
concerning the features of possible extensions – or simply consistent interpretations – of quantum 
theory. 
 
 
3 REALISM in the strict anticorrelation framework 
 
We have seen that according to both Leggett and Gröblacher et al, the heart of the Bell theorem is 
local realism and, as a matter of fact, all these authors refer explicitly to the celebrated article 
published by John S. Bell in 1964 when mentioning the Bell theorem. Curiously enough, the 
clearest and most useful starting point in order to see why their statements are wrong is exactly the 
opening of the 1964 Bell  article (Bell (1964)). In the first pages, Bell summarizes the EPR-Bohm 
incompleteness argument in order to state unambiguously the premises from which his own non-
locality theorem is to proceed. I will start first from the informal wording that Bell himself employs 
in stating the aim of his article, and I will proceed to a step-by-step formulation of the EPR-Bohm 
argument in order to show that a REALISMG&AL condition is derived and not assumed. Finally I will 
quote the Bell summary of the situation, a summary that once again states clearly the derivative 
character of REALISMG&AL. 
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 John S. Bell opens his article as follows: 
The paradox8 of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen was advanced as an argument that quantum mechanics 
could not be a complete theory but should be supplemented by additional variables. These additional 
variables were to restore causality and locality. In this note that idea will be formulated 
mathematically and shown to be incompatible with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. It 
is the requirement of locality, or more precisely that the result of a measurement on one system be 
unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past, that creates the 
essential difficulty. (Bell (1964), in Bell (2004), p. 14, italics added) 
  
As is well known, the EPR-Bohm framework consists in a system S1+S2 of two spin-1/2 particles S1 
and S2 prepared at time t0 in the singlet spin state  
Ψ = 1/√2 (|1,+>n |2,−>n − |1, −>n |2,+>n ), 
 
where n is a generic spatial direction. We assume that spin measurements are performed on 
subsystems S1 and S2 at space-like separation. According to the standard rules of quantum 
mechanics, we know that 
 
• REDUCED STATES (RS) if the state of S1+S2 is Ψ, then 
(reduced) state of S1 → ρ(1,Ψ) = 1/2 (P|1, +>n + P|1, −>n), 
(reduced) state of S2 → ρ(2,Ψ) = 1/2 (P|2, +>n + P|2, −>n), 
and, for any n, 
Probρ(1,Ψ) (spin n of S1 = +1) = Probρ(1,Ψ) (spin n of S1 = −1) = 1/2  
Probρ(2,Ψ) (spin n of S2 = +1) = Probρ(2,Ψ) (spin n of S2 = − 1) = 1/2  
 
• PERFECT ANTICORRELATION (PAC) If at time t a spin measurement is performed on the 
subsystem S1 in direction n and the outcome +1 [−1] is obtained, then a spin measurement on the 
                                                 
8
 By the way: in his celebrated 1964 paper, Bell himself – and this is not the least important aspect in which we should 
appreciate his clear thinking – simply pays lip service to the use of the word ‘paradox’ in connection with the EPR 
arrangement; for in the second line of the first page of the paper he aptly stresses that we deal with an argument, namely 
a finite and ordered sequence of sentences whose validity we can assess by individuating clearly the premises and by 
checking whether the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises themselves. As we will see briefly, the history 
of the misunderstandings in stating clearly which are the premises both of the EPR argument and of the derivation of 
the Bell-type inequalities is not over. And in the now classic ‘Bertlmann’s socks’ paper (details below), Bell says: “And 
as if a child has asked: How come they always choose different colours when they are looked at? How does the second 
sock know what the first has done? Paradox indeed! But for the others, not for EPR. EPR did not use the word 
‘paradox’. They were with the man in the street in this business. For them these correlations simply showed that the 
quantum theorists had been hasty in dismissing the reality of the microscopic world.” (Bell (2004), p. 143) 
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subsystem S2 in the same direction n at an immediately subsequent time t′ > t  will have with 
certainty the outcome −1 [+1], namely   
ProbΨ [(spin n of S1 = +1) | (spin n of S2 = − 1)] =  
ProbΨ [(spin n of S1 = −1) | (spin n of S2 = + 1)] = 1.     
 
Let us suppose now that we perform at time t1 > t0  a spin measurement on S1 in the direction n with 
outcome +1. Then, according to PAC, a spin measurement on S2 in the same direction n at a time t2 
> t1 will give with certainty the outcome −1. Let us suppose further to assume the following 
condition: 
 
PROPERTY-DEFINITENESS - If, without interacting with a physical system S, we can predict with 
certainty  - or with probability 1 - the value q of a physical quantity Q pertaining to S, then q 
represents an objective property of S (denoted by [q]).  
 
It is worth stressing that this condition amounts not to assuming the existence of objective 
properties, but rather to giving a sufficient condition for a property of a physical system to be 
‘objective’. In a nutshell:  
(EPR-Bohm) PROPERTY-DEFINITENESS ≠  REALISM
 G&AL. 
 
Then, at t2 > t1 [spin n = −1]  represents an objective property of S2. But let us ask now: might the 
property [spin
 n = −1]  of S2  have been somehow “created” by the spin measurement on S1? The 
answer is clearly negative if we assume the following condition: 
 
LOCALITY - No objective property of a physical system S can be affected by operations performed 
on physical systems isolated from S. 
 
Then, according to LOCALITY, the existence of the property [spin
 n = −1] of S2  can be inferred also 
relatively to a time t′ such that t0 > t′ >t1. But at time t′ the state of S1+S2 is the singlet state Ψ. 
Therefore, according to (RS), the state of S2 at time t′   is the reduced state 
ρ(2,Ψ)=1/2(P|2,+ >n + P|2,−>n ), 
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a state that assigns to the property [spin
 n = −1] of S2 only the probability 1/2. Let us finally assume 
the following condition: 
 
COMPLETENESS - Any objective property of a physical system S must be represented within the 
physical theory that describes S. 
 
Then there exist objective properties of physical systems, such as [spin
 n = −1] for S2, that quantum 
mechanics is unable to represent: it follows that quantum mechanics is incomplete.  
Let us ask now: 
Is it assumed somewhere in the argument  that  properties such as [spin
 n = − 1] pre-
exist, namely they exist independently, over and above any spin measurement?  
or 
Does PROPERTY-DEFINITENESS imply only by definition that such properties as [spin
 n 
= −1] pre-exist, namely they exist independently, over and above any spin 
measurement? 
The answer to both questions is clearly negative! That such properties as [spin
 n = −1] are to exist 
for S2 independently, over and above any spin measurement is not assumed but rather is a 
consequence of the other assumptions of the argument. In fact,  
 
• according to PAC 
Prob
 Ψ [(spin n of S1 = +1) & (spin n of S2 = −1)] = 1, for any n, 
• according to PROPERTY-DEFINITENESS  
the outcomes of the spin measurements in the singlet state satisfy the 
condition of objective properties 
• according to LOCALITY 
such outcomes have not been created by the distant measurement and 
then were ‘already there’. 
 
And here is the Bell summary: 
 
Consider a pair of spin one-half particles created somehow in the singlet spin state and moving freely 
in opposite directions. Measurements can be made, say by Stern-Gerlach magnets, on selected 
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components of the spins σ1 and σ2. If measurement of the component σ1•a, where a is some unit 
vector, yields the value +1 then, according to quantum mechanics, measurement of σ2•a must yield the 
value -1 and vice versa. Now we make the hypothesis, and it seems one at least worth considering, that 
if the two measurements are made at places remote from one another the orientation of one magnet 
does not influence the result obtained with the other. Since we can predict in advance the result of 
measuring any chosen component of σ2, by previously measuring the same component of σ1, it follows 
that the result of any such measurement must actually be predetermined. Since the initial quantum 
mechanical wave function does not determine the result of an individual measurement, this 
predetrmination implies the possibility of a more complete specification of the state. (Bell (1964), in 
Bell (2004), pp. 14-15, italics added) 
 
As should be clear from a fair reading of the Bell original article, the Bell theorem starts exactly 
from the alternative established by the EPR-Bohm argument – namely, locality and completeness 
cannot stand together – and goes for the proof that, whatever form the completability of quantum 
mechanics might assume, the resulting theory cannot preserve the statistical predictions of quantum 
mechanics and be local at the same time: this means that neither a pre-existing-property assumption 
(or Objectivity or Classicality or whatever synonymous one likes to choose) nor a determinism 
assumption  are assumed in the derivation of the original Bell inequality. Therefore all claims – 
Leggett (2003) and Gröblacher et al (2007) included – to the effect that the Bell theorem in the 1964 
setting concerns ‘local realism’ are completely ill-founded. As Bell himself (vox clamantis in 
deserto) clearly stresses: 
 
It is important to note that to the limited degree to which determinism plays a role in the EPR 
argument, it is not assumed but inferred. What is held sacred is the principle of ‘local causality’ - or 
‘no action at a distance’. [...] It is remarkably difficult to get this point across, that determinism is not a 
presupposition of the analysis.” […] My own first paper on this subject [Bell refers here to his 1964 
paper] starts with a summary of the EPR paper from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the 
commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic hidden variables. 
(Bell 1981, in Bell (2004), pp. 143, 157 footnote 10, italics in the original) 
 
To sum up, the true logic of the argument is the following (‘PP’ stands for ‘Pre-existing 
properties’): 
1. QM ∧ LOC → PP       [EPR-Bohm Argument] 
2. PP → ¬ QM         [Bell Theorem]9 
3. QM            [Assumption] 
                                                 
9
 For an extremely easy and compact formulation of the Bell theorem for the strict correlation case, see Dürr, Goldstein, 
Zanghì (2004). 
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4. QM → ¬ PP         [2, 3 Modus tollens] 
5. ¬ PP            [3, 4 Modus ponens] 
6. ¬ PP → ¬ (QM ∧ LOC)     [1, 5 Modus tollens] 
7. ¬ (QM ∧ LOC)        [5, 6 Modus ponens] 
 
∴ ¬ LOC 
 
 
But there is more to this question. That REALISMG&AL cannot be a reasonable independent 
assumption of any allegedly ‘objective’ theory of quantum phenomena can be argued on the basis 
of what was already clearly demonstrated by Bell himself in the article that preceded the Bell 
theorem article, although as is well known, it was published after it (Bell (1966)). In this 
fundamental article Bell showed that all existing no-hidden variable theories proofs (Gleason, 
Jauch-Piron, Kochen-Specker and an additional proof provided by Bell himself as a simplified 
version of the Kochen-Specker theorem) required assumptions that it was not reasonable to require 
from any hypothetical completion of quantum theory10:  
 
It will be urged that these analyses [i.e. the above mentioned proofs] leave the real question 
untouched. In fact it will be seen that these demonstrations require from the hypothetical dispersion 
free states, not only that appropriate ensembles thereof should have all measurable properties of 
quantum mechanical states, but certain other properties as well. These additional demands appear 
reasonable when results of measurement are loosely identified with properties of isolated systems. 
They are seen to be quite unreasonable when one remembers with Bohr ‘the impossibility of any sharp 
distinction between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments 
which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear’. (Bell (1966), in Bell (2004), 
pp. 1-2, italics added) 
 
If REALISMG&AL were an independent assumption of any hidden variable theory, Gleason-Bell-
Kochen & Specker would have already proved their incompatibility with quantum mechanics 
needless of any locality requirement. But, as Bell showed, there is little significance in testing 
against quantum theory a theory (be it local or non-local) that is supposed to satisfy a condition that 
                                                 
10
 Bell also mentions an especially restrictive assumption of the von Neumann theorem, an ssumption which makes the 
von Neumann formulation much stronger with respect to the non-contextual formulations given by Gleason, Jauch-
Piron, Bell and Kochen-Specker, and hence even less plausible (for a detailed analysis of the von Neumann ‘no-go’ 
theorem see Giuntini, Laudisa (2001). 
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we already know quantum mechanics cannot possibly and reasonably satisfy11. The same point 
occurs interestingly in another Zeilinger article, a short essay published on Nature in 2005 and 
entitled The message of the quantum (Zeilinger (2005)). Here,  the author, after claiming once again 
that “John Bell showed that quantum prediction for entanglement are in conflict with local realism”, 
argues:  
 
Most physicists view the experimental confirmation of the quantum predictions as evidence for 
nonlocality. But I think that the concept of reality itself is at stake, a view that is supported by the 
Kochen-Specker paradox. This observes that even for single particles it is not always possible to 
assign definite measurement outcomes, independently of and prior to the selection of specific 
apparatus in the specific experiment. (p. 743) 
 
Curious argument indeed! Zeilinger first uses the Kochen-Specker theorem in order to support the 
idea that it is not possible to ascribe pre-existing properties even to single systems (making the 
unwarranted assumption that the only logically consistent way of defining realism is in terms of 
pre-existing properties) and then he takes seriously the project of experimentally testing the 
incompatibility between quantum mechanics and a theory that is non-local and realistic in the sense 
of what the Kochen-Specker theorem prohibits one from assuming. Why then worry about the 
confirmation of quantum prediction in laboratories and not be content with the Kochen-Specker 
theorem itself?12 
 
 
4 REALISM in the non-strict anticorrelation framework 
 
Although the Bell 1964 article is always cited as the locus classicus for the non-locality theorem, its 
formulation is not fully general. In fact, the ideal setting outlined in the paper crucially relies on 
strict anticorrelation, whereas subsequent investigations have explored the possibility of dropping it 
(also in view of an experimental realization of the setting itself). Very much in the spirit that 
Gröblacher et al would have voiced in 2007, it has been claimed (Žukowski (2005)) that also in 
these more general frameworks (in which a class of so-called stochastic hidden-variable theories 
                                                 
11
 This point had been stressed in Laudisa (1997), where a discussion of the relationship between the Bell 1966 and the 
Bell 1964 articles – from  the point of view of the consistency of any hidden variable approach to quantum theory – can 
be found. Bell recalls this point still in the opening page of his 1964 paper: “There have been attempts to show that even 
without such a separability or locality requirement no ‘hidden variable’ interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible. 
These attempts have been examined elsewhere and found wanting [Bell refers here to his 1966 article]” (Bell (1964), in 
Bell (2004), p. 14). Most recently, the same charge has been clearly stated and motivated in Norsen (2007), pp. 317-8, 
where my condition (i) in the formulation of REALISMG&AL is called ‘naive realism’. 
12
 For further critical remarks on this Zeilinger article see Daumer, Dürr, Goldstein, Maudlin, Tumulka, Zanghì (2006). 
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was introduced) a REALISMG&AL condition was among the assumptions that led to the derivation of 
a  more general inequality, an inequality that can be shown to be violated by the corresponding 
statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. 
 In the stochastic hidden-variable theories’ framework (originally introduced in Bell (1971) and 
Clauser, Horne (1974)), a typical joint system S1+S2 is prepared at a source – very much like the 
polarization process situation introduced in section 2 and concerning the Leggett approach – so  that 
a ‘completion’ parameter λ is associated with  the single and joint detection counts. Suppose we 
denote by a and b respectively the setting parameters concerning two detectors, located at space-
like separation and devised to register the arrival of S1 and S2 respectively. The model then is 
assumed to satisfy the following conditions: 
 
• BCH1. λ is distributed according to a function ρ(λ) that does not depend either on a or on b. 
• BCH2. The parameter λ prescribes single and joint detection probability. 
• BCH3. Locality holds, namely the λ-induced probability for the measurement outcomes for 
S1 and S2 separately is such that (i) the detection probability for S1 depends only on λ and a, 
(ii) the detection probability for S2 depends only on λ and b, (iii) and the joint detection 
probability is simply the product of the detection probability for S1 and the detection 
probability for S2. 
 
According to the view presupposed in Leggett (2003), Žukowski (2005) and Gröblacher et al 
(2007), these stochastic hidden variable theories include a form of REALISMG&AL among their 
assumptions. Žukowski (2005), for instance, focuses on the Bell discussion of the motivations 
underlying this framework (Bell (1981)) and reformulates his assumptions “in today’s wording”: 
 
Realism. To put it short: results of unperformed measurements have certain, unknown but fixed, 
values. In Bell wording this is equivalent to the hypothesis of the existence of hidden variables. 
Locality. “The direct cause (and effects) of events are near by, and even indirect causes (and effects) 
are no further away than permitted by the velocity of light” (p. 239), in short, events and actions in 
Alice’s lab cannot influence directly simultaneous events in Bob’s lab and his acts, etc. 
“Free Will”. The settings of local apparata are independent of the hidden variables (which determine 
the local results) and can be changed without changing the distribution of local hidden variables (p. 
154). In short, Alice and Bob have a free will to fix the local apparatus settings, or more mildly, one 
can always have a stochastic process that governs the local choices of the settings, which is 
statistically independent from other processes in the experiment (especially those fixing the hidden 
variables). (Žukowski (2005), pp. 569-570) 
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On the basis of this set of assumptions, Žukowski argues that the Bell theorem (in the general 
stochastic formulation) has been ‘overinterpreted’ (Žukowski (2005), p. 571). The logical structure 
of the Žukowski reconstruction is the following. If we denote with R, LOC and FW the above 
assumptions of Realism, Locality and Free Will, respectively, with BI the Bell Inequalities and with 
QM the assumption of the validity of the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics, we have 
 
 
0.  R, LOC, FW        [Assumptions] 
1.  R ∧ LOC ∧ FW → BI    [Bell Theorem (in the Žukowski interpretation)] 
2.  QM           [Assumption]  
3.  QM → ¬ BI        [Experimental fact] 
4.  ¬ BI           [2, 3 Modus ponens] 
5.  ¬ BI → ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC ∨ ¬ FW  [1, 4 Modus tollens] 
6.  ¬ BI → ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC     [FW is an assumption] 
 
∴  ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC 
 
That is, since FW seems out of question, therefore the dilemma ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC remains. It is at this 
point that the ‘overinterpretation’ paradox comes in. Since, according to the derivation above, we 
are left with the alternative ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC, Žukowski sees no compelling justification for dropping 
LOC rather than R. In Žukowski’s view the ‘overinterpretation’ of the Bell theorem would be 
exactly the ‘automatic’ move from ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC to ¬ LOC, a move that in logical terms is not  
necessary .13 
 
Here comes another paradox: the consequences of Bell’s theorem as they are now most frequently 
presented to the entire physics community. [...] There is nothing in the quantum formalism that would 
necessarily imply non-locality” (Žukowski (2005), pp. 571-572).  
 
                                                 
13
 According to logic alone, of course, from ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC you can derive both ¬ R and ¬ LOC if the negation of 
neither has been derived earlier. The real point is the choice of the premises: as will be shown shortly, R need not be an 
independent premise and hence the derivation does not yield ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC but rather ¬ LOC. 
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The conclusion is obvious: why not drop R instead, keeping locality together with quantum 
mechanics?14 
A fair reading of the Bell argument in his 1981 article shows that the above conclusion by 
Žukowski is totally unwarranted. There Bell envisages the possibility of introducing  an EPR-Bohm 
set-up in very general terms, in which we are interested in the joint probability distribution  
P(A, B | a, b), 
where each A and B may be a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ and a and b stand respectively for two possible 
adjustable parameters (with the obvious interpretation). No mention of what sort of systems are 
involved need be made, and once some sort of BCH1-BCH3 conditions are assumed, it is easy to 
show the derivation of a CHSH inequality. Before deriving the inequality, in order to make clear 
what the real assumptions in the argument are and how general the presentation is intended to be, 
Bell explicitly states: 
 
Despite my insistence that the determinism was inferred rather than assumed [N.d.R. a new hint at the 
frequent misunderstandings of this inference in the original EPR and in his 1964 paper], you might 
still suspect somehow that it is a preoccupation with determinism that creates the problem. Note well 
that the following argument makes no mention whatever of determinism […] Finally you might suspect 
that the very notion of particle, and particle orbit has somehow led us astray […] So the following 
argument will not mention particles, nor indeed fields, nor any particular picture of what goes on at the 
microscopic level. Nor will it involve any use of the words ‘quantum mechanical system”, which can 
have an unfortunate effect on the discussion. The difficulty is not created by any such picture or any 
such terminology. It is created by the predictions about the correlations in the visible outputs of 
certain conceivable experimental set-ups.” (Bell (1981), in Bell (2004), p. 150, italics added) 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the Bell discussion is twofold: first, nowhere in the Bell-CH 
arguments does the Realism assumption play any role; second, interpretations such as  Žukowski’s 
are affected by the prejudice that a metaphysical and totemic notion of Microphysical Reality was 
what Bell preoccupied himself with. Moreover, in order to explain in what sense just locality is the 
focus of the argument, Bell (1981) draws an example from ordinary life. Suppose we find a 
correlation between the rate of heart attacks h in two different and distant towns called A and B, 
namely 
p(hA, hB) ≠ p(hA) p(hB) 
                                                 
14
 This echoes very closely the view expressed in a passage of the Leggett (2003) article quoted above: “I believe that 
the results of the present investigations provide quantitative backing  for a point of view which I believe is by now 
certainly well accepted at the qualitative level, namely that the incompatibility of the predictions of objective local 
theories with those of quantum mechanics has relatively to do with locality and much to do with objectivity.” (Leggett 
(2003), p. 1470) 
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where clearly hA and hB denote respectively the rate of heart attacks in A and in B. Since A and B 
are supposed to be so far away from each other that it is not imaginable at the outset that there is 
some direct influence at work, a sound scientific attitude would lead us first – Bell claims – to make 
the hypothesis that there are some factors that contribute locally to the apparently correlated rates. 
Let us call these collective factors LA and LB. According to this locality assumption, it will be then 
reasonable to assume 
p(hA, hB  LA , LB, λ) =  p(hA  LA , λ)  p(hB  LB, λ) 
where λ denotes collectively any other relevant variables. 
The attitude toward the justification of the locality condition in terms of a similar 
‘factorizability’ in the derivation of the Bell inequality for stochastic hidden variables models is 
essentially the same: “let us suppose that the correlations in the EPR experiment are likewise 
«locally explicable» (Bell (1981), in Bell (2004), p. 152). Namely, the core of the argument lies in 
stating what preventing any action-at-a-distance amounts to, whatever the factors at A and B might 
be. The above assumption need not be grounded on the additional assumption that there are some 
pre-existing properties in the common past of the relevant events at A and B that enhance the 
correlation15. Such assumption would be certainly sufficient for the assumption of existence of local 
factors, but not necessary. Namely, it is true that the assumption of pre-existing properties for the 
two systems at the source might well imply locality, but the assumption that only local operations 
and influences can contribute to fix the single detection probabilities need not follow from pre-
existing properties, and rightly so: as we stressed in the previous section, assuming pre-existing 
properties in a model that is to be tested against quantum mechanics, when quantum mechanics 
itself prevents us from allowing pre-existing properties when describing physical interactions in its 
own proper terms, would deprive the model under scrutiny of any foundational significance. 
If the whole point of the Bell-CH arguments is then in fact to show that the correlations between 
the results A and B are not locally explicable, no matter what the relation is between A and B on 
one side and some allegedly ‘objective’ or ‘pre-existing’ properties corresponding to them on the 
other, we can safely say that also in the more general (no perfect correlation) case, there is no ‘local 
realism’ at stake. Logically, the argument then proceeds  as follows 
 
0.  LOC, FW       [Assumptions] 
1.  LOC ∧ FW → BI    [Bell theorem]    
2.  QM → ¬ BI      [Experimental fact] 
                                                 
15
 A similar point, although relative to the derivation of the CHSH inequality in Clauser, Horne, Shimony, Holt (1969), 
has been raised by Norsen (2007), p. 319. 
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3.  QM         [Assumption] 
4.  ¬ BI         [2, 3 Modus ponens] 
5.  ¬ BI → ¬ LOC ∨ ¬ FW  [1, 4 Modus tollens] 
 
 
∴  ¬ LOC  
 
 
5 On the significance of non-local REALISTIC theories 
 
We are now in a position to assess the prospects and the significance of the investigations on the 
new class of non-local REALISTICG&AL hidden-variable theories, the class for which Leggett (2003) 
claims the proof of a  new ‘incompatibility’ theorem, the latest in a long series of ‘no-go theorems’ 
about quantum mechanics. But let me sum up first the conclusions established in the preceding 
sections. 
 
(1) The condition that we have referred to as REALISMG&AL is not a reasonable condition to 
require from any meaningful hidden variable theory, since it would make the confrontation between 
such theory and quantum mechanics totally uninteresting. Should REALISMG&AL be required, 
quantum mechanics would be in outright contradiction with the hidden variable theory, no matter 
whether any statistical predictions are taken into account or whether any experiment is carried out, 
but ruling out such a vacuous hidden variable theory would not teach us any useful lesson about the 
foundations of quantum mechanics. A clear formulation of this fact is already contained in the two 
groundbreaking – but still misunderstood! – articles by  John S. Bell published in 1964 and 1966.  
 
(2) Even if ex absurdo we suppose that REALISMG&AL is a reasonable requirement, it can be 
shown (and this is to be credited again to John S. Bell) that such requirement plays no fundamental 
role in the Bell theorem, either in its strict correlation version or in its non-strict correlation version. 
If this is the case, the meaning of the Bell theorem lies not in its casting light on how far we should 
go in renouncing  our cherished ‘realistic’ view of the microworld if we want to maintain the 
statistical and empirical content of quantum theory, but rather in demostrating once and for all that 
any theory (be it endowed with ‘hidden variables’ or not) that is to save the agreement with the 
statistical predictions of quantum mechanics must be non-local. What non-locality exactly will 
entail in a specific theory will depend on the particular structure and conceptual resources of the 
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theory, but two features will have to be part of any such theory: first, the theory will have to take 
into account non-locality as a basic property at least of the world of microscopic systems and, 
second, if the theory is introduced as endowed with a clear ontology – namely, endowed with some 
clear indications as to the nature and structure of that basic spacetime inventory of the world that 
the theory is supposed to be about – the ontology itself could not possibly be simply ‘realistic’ in 
the unreasonable sense of REALISMG&AL.  
 
 Under (1) and (2), the research program of non-local REALISTICG&AL hidden-variable theories 
can then have no foundational significance, in that we can hardly learn anything from the attempt of 
establishing the compatibility or incompatibility of quantum mechanics with a class of theories 
satisfying such unreasonable assumptions. As a consequence, if REALISMG&AL is not a reasonable 
assumption to make for any significant alternative theory that is to be tested against quantum 
mechanics, this will hold both for local REALISTICG&AL hidden-variable theories and for non-local 
REALISTICG&AL hidden-variable theories.  
 But let us go further and take a closer look at the motivations that Leggett himself discusses in 
support of the assumptions satisfied by his non-local REALISTICG&AL hidden-variable theories. As 
we recalled earlier (section 2), the theories in the Leggett class are supposed to account for the 
results obtained in a general experimental framework, in which some polarization measurements are 
performed on pairs of photons emitted by atoms in a cascade process. The Leggett-type of theories 
are such that each pair of photons emitted in the cascade of a given single atom is characterized by a 
unique value of some set of hidden variables: this value, denoted by λ, is characterized by a 
normalized distribution function ρ(λ) and is assumed to be independent of any parameter 
concerning polarizer settings (denoted in the sequel with a and b) and detection processes. Finally, 
the Leggett-type of theories may display some non-locality: if A and B denote respectively two 
variables that take the value + 1 (− 1) according as the detectors D1 and D2  register (do not register) 
the arrival of a photon, the value of A may depend not only on a and λ but also possibly on b, and 
similarly the value of B may depend not only on b and λ but also possibly on a (Leggett (2003), p. 
1471 ff).  
The non-locality assumption deserves a discussion on its own. Leggett introduces his ‘new’ class 
of hidden variable theories by subtraction, so to say. In fact, he first introduces local 
REALISTICG&AL hidden-variable theories, namely theories that satisfy L1 and L2 and for which the 
following equalities hold 
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A(a, b, λ, B) = A(a, b, λ), 
Outcome Independence 
B(b, a, λ, A) = B(b, a, λ) 
 
 
A(a, b, λ, B) = A(a, λ, B) 
Setting Independence 
B(b, a, λ, A) = B(b, λ, A) 
 
 
Clearly, under Outcome Independence (SI) and Setting Independence (OI), the expression for 
the correlation P(a, b) to be measured becomes 
P(a, b) = ∫Λ A(a, b, λ, B) B(b, a, λ, A) ρ(λ) dλ = ∫Λ A(a, λ) B(b, λ,) ρ(λ) dλ, 
namely,  the usual expression for the locality assumption in stochastic hidden variable models. The 
Leggett-type of theories, in addition to L1 and L2, are assumed to satisfy Outcome Independence 
but in general fail to satisfy Setting Independence. That is, the Leggett framework inherits the 
interpretation of locality as a conjunction of SI and OI (Jarrett (1984))16 and then proposes 
investigating  the compatibility with quantum mechanics of a theory which – although ‘realistic’ – 
is non-local in the sense of being possibly setting-dependent (Leggett (2003), p. 1474). Curiously 
enough, however, the assumption of Outcome Independence is motivated by the following 
statement: 
 
I shall rather arbitrarily assert assumption (4) (outcome independence), The reason for doing it is not 
so much that it is particularly “natural” [...] but it is a purely practical one; if one relaxes (4) it appears 
rather unlikely (though I have no rigorous proof) that one can prove anything useful at all, and in 
particular it appears very likely that one can reproduce the quantum-mechanical results for an arbitrary 
experiment. (Leggett (2003), p. 1475) 
 
In fact, it can be proved that quantum mechanics violates Outcome Independence17. Then, 
although it is conceivable that a model intended to be ‘strongly’ non-local is formulated to be – as it 
were – ‘more non-local’ than quantum mechanics itself is supposed to be (namely by dropping 
                                                 
16
 Personally I do not find the ‘peaceful coexistence’ strategy (for instance, Shimony (1984)), relying on the Jarrett 
distinction, either convincing or illuminating on the issue of how quantum mechanical non-locality is supposed to 
coexist with special relativity (see for instance Maudlin (20022), pp. 93-98). Here I presuppose it only the sake of 
discussion.  
17
 See for instance Butterfield, Fleming, Ghirardi, Grassi (1993). 
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Setting Independence, which quantum mechanics satisfies 18), on the other hand, if the model is 
assumed to satisfy Outcome Independence, the incompatibility between the correlations 
prescribed by the model and the quantum correlations might always be ascribed to the circumstance 
that quantum mechanics does not satisfy Outcome Independence. This in turn would not allow us 
to conclude anything about the failure or the survival of REALISMG&AL, which presumably was the 
aim of the whole model.  
Moreover, there is a further ‘hidden variable’ model which satisfies Outcome Independence but 
not Setting Independence – namely Bohmian mechanics19, whose consistency directly refutes the 
claims of Leggett and followers. In fact, Bohmian mechanics satisfies REALISMG&AL and 
nevertheless provides a perfectly consistent account for all phenomena that quantum mechanics is 
able to treat unambiguously (Goldstein (2001)), providing in addition a clear and law-governed 
ontology of particles evolving in spacetime. How can it be? On the one hand, the measurement 
outcomes in Bohmian mechanics are determined by pre-existing, measurement-independent 
properties of the measured system, namely the precise positions of the particles in the system and, 
of course, the wavefunction20. On the other hand,  
 
in Bohmian mechanics the random variables ZE giving the results of experiments E depend, of course, 
on the experiment, and there is no reason that this should not be the case when the experiments under 
consideration happen to be associated with the same operator. Thus with any self-adjoint operator A, 
Bohmian mechanics naturally may associate many different random variables ZE,one for each different 
experiment E → A associated with A. A crucial point here is that the map E → A is many-to-one” 
(Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì (2004), p. 1040).  
 
So, Leggett, Gröblacher and the others fail to appreciate that the consistency of Bohmian mechanics 
is a direct refutation of their approach since they appear to assume that the preexisting properties 
that determine the outcome must somehow mathematically resemble the eigenstates of Hermitian 
operators. But that very specific claim is surely no part of “realism”. One needs to note that 
standard quantum theory associates physically different experimental set-ups with the same 
Hermitian operator (“observable”). But it is no part of “realism” to demand that physically different 
set-ups be treated alike: the way that the pre-existent positions determine the outcome of an 
experiment may of course depend on just how the experiment is set up. 
                                                 
18
 See again Butterfield, Fleming, Ghirardi, Grassi (1993). 
19
 See for instance Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì (1996), Goldstein (2001).  
20
 See for instance the discussion of exactly how the pre-existent locations of particle determine the outcomes of "spin 
measurements" in Albert (1992).  
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 However, Gröblacher et al (2007) very briefly mention Bohmian mechanics with a highly 
dismissive attitude. But there are here at least three additional points that deserve attention. First, 
Gröblacher et al (2007) refer to Bohmian mechanics in its old-fashioned formulation with quantum 
potential, but they do not seem to be even aware that the contemporary formulation of the theory, 
known as Bohmian mechanics, can do totally without any quantum potential21. Second, they 
underrate the circumstance that even in its quantum potential formulation Bohmian mechanics is a 
counterexample to their general claims. Third, they overlook the fact that Bohmian mechanics has a 
clear explanation of why the theory satisfies Outcome Independence and fails to satisfy Setting 
Independence (see again for instance  Maudlin (20022), p. 94) whereas  quantum mechanics has  
no such explanation as to why it satisfies Setting Independence and violates Outcome 
Independence, and  the Leggett-type non-local realistic hidden variable theory is unable to account 
in an intelligible way for the validity of Outcome Independence and the failure of Setting 
Independence. Presumably it is the biased claim that, in order for a theory to be objective in some 
meaningful sense, a REALISMG&AL condition must be assumed, that motivates why neither Leggett 
(2003) nor Gröblacher et al (2007) (nor all other defenders of REALISMG&AL as a reasonable 
assumption for hidden variable theories) take into account one of the few seriously objective 
(namely observer-free) interpretations that are both consistent and alternative to quantum mechanics 
in a viable sense.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As I have tried to show in the preceding sections, there is a strong prejudice surrounding the 
foundational meaning of the Bell theorem, a prejudice that seems to survive intact through the 
years, in spite of the clear statements to the contrary repeatedly expressed – to begin with – by the 
inventor of the theorem itself, namely John S. Bell. This prejudice not only survives but in the last 
years has become even stronger, supported as it is by an emphasis on quantum computation that 
tends to dissolve all deep conceptual problems of standard quantum theory into a new information-
theoretic orthodoxy22. According to this prejudice, the core of the Bell theorem concerns a 
philosophical notion – realism – and proves that such notion is untenable on physical grounds, 
namely holding to it implies quantitative predictions that are contradicted by the quantum 
predictions. This interpretation sounds very much like  the ultimate death sentence for realism, and 
                                                 
21
 For a survey, see Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì (1996) and for an illuminating analysis of the superiority of the recent 
formulation over the old one, see Goldstein (1996), pp. 156-160. 
22
 For an interesting and recent assessment of this tendency see Hagar (2007). 
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such a sentence seems hard to resist since it is physics which pronounces it, namely the queen of the 
hard sciences. As argued above, this approach overlooks the circumstance that, in order to assess 
the implications of a theorem, we have to be clear about the conditions under which the theorem can 
be proved, and one need not be a physicist to acknowledge it. What logical soundness and physical 
reasonableness suggest (sections 3-5) is that the role of Bell’s theorem is not to set constraints on 
how ‘realist’ we are allowed to be about quantum systems but rather, much more interestingly, to 
characterize a structural property of any theory that aims to cover the domain of validity covered so 
far by quantum mechanics, namely non-locality. As a consequence, whether a theory aiming to 
supersede quantum theory will be ‘realist’, ‘non-realist’, ‘half-realist’ or ‘one-third realist’, this will 
concern the further conceptual and formal resources of that theory and not at all the Bell theorem. 
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